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 In the second generation of the U.S. government’s leadership, at a time 
when the number of states in the union had more than doubled that of 1787, more 
territories were under consideration for statehood, and the founding fathers were 
no longer living to clarify the intentions of the Constitutional Convention’s 
attendees, there persisted a question of the extent to which the federal government 
should establish and maintain economic enterprises. Efforts of Democrats (the 
political party that touted itself as speaking for the Common Man) to “limit 
federal intervention in the economy”
1
 contravened the work of Whigs (the party 
of business and of economic stability)
2
 to reestablish a national bank for the third 
time in the young nation’s history. 
Amidst this upheaval, an attempt by Henry Clay to limit the presidential 
veto power threatened to fundamentally alter the law enactment process. The 
Constitutional amendments Clay proposed were not viewed lightly by members of 
the Senate, particularly not by John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, who 
challenged Clay’s resolution with a masterful oration before the Senate on 
February 28, 1842.
 
Calhoun’s speech, comprehensive in its analysis of the 
functions of each of the three government branches, served to turn the focus of the 
Senate away from the special interests of each of its factions to a broader 
consideration of the overall role fulfilled by the veto power. By championing an 
interpretation of the Constitution that claimed the representative system of 
government to be an ongoing negotiation between democracy and mixed 
government, Calhoun evoked what I term “religious republicanism,” a political 
philosophy that borrows ideas from traditions of both Christian and classical 
republican thought. In the following analysis, I will first provide a brief history of 
the events that spurred Calhoun’s speech in order to interrogate the rhetorical 
situation. I will then define religious republicanism and explore its construction 
throughout the speech, paying particular attention to Calhoun’s inductive 
reasoning strategy. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of the speech’s 
impact. By analyzing Calhoun’s particular rhetorical turn to religious 
republicanism, we get a sense for the general ways in which political ideals can be 
used to both expand and limit democracy and democratic discourse. The 
abstractness of an ideal like religious republicanism offers opportunities for the 
development of a more robust democracy; however, as Calhoun demonstrates, the 
same ideal can also be used to limit progress—indeed, to effect a return to a 
former era. 
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The Election of 1840 and the Tyler Bank Debates – Self-Destruction of the Whig 
Party 
 
The issue of whether a Bank of the United States was a constitutional 
means for executing the Congressional powers to levy taxes, regulate commerce, 
or coin and borrow money dates back to the U.S. government’s earliest 
administration. Differing views about the Bank and other economic policy 
debates, which directly influenced Clay’s amendments to restrict the presidential 
veto power, resurfaced in the election of 1840, the first of only two presidential 
campaigns from which the Whigs emerged victorious.
3
 This victory quickly began 
to look like self-destruction, however, when the victor, elderly war hero William 
Henry Harrison, died after only one month in office and his presidential duties 
devolved upon Vice-President John Tyler. 
 Tyler was a marginal Whig at best, proclaimed by David Currie to actually 
be a “Democrat in Whig clothing.”
4
 Nevertheless, most Whigs were convinced 
that Tyler, when called to the presidency, would ultimately support the platform 
of the party that elected him.  Democrats, however, clung to the hope that Tyler 
would hold to his long-held beliefs.
5
 The Democrats were not disappointed. For 
although Clay, the uncontested leader of the Whig party, thought of Tyler as 
weak-willed, Tyler was proud, principled, and stubborn.
6
 
Tyler certainly maintained his principles in the economic reform 
discussions that followed his ascension to the highest office in the land, twice 
vetoing bills to incorporate national fiscal entities that appeared to him to function 
like banks. He acknowledged the need for a “suitable fiscal agent” to collect, 
safeguard, and distribute public funds, but did not believe a national bank met the 
criteria of such a “suitable” agent, a conviction his fellow Whigs knew he had 
sustained for twenty five years.
7
 Thus, Tyler vetoed not one but two bills calling 
for the establishment of national fiscal institutions.
8
 He attempted a compromise 
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by proposing his own alternative to a national bank: a Board of Exchequer that 
would retain independent powers beneath the Secretary of the Treasury “to 
manage the currency and to employ banks and other institutions as agents.”
9
 The 
Exchequer received very little popular support, leaving the business of public 
revenues hostage to the intraparty dispute between the Whig-controlled legislative 
and executive branches of the Federal government. 
Calhoun remained uncharacteristically inconspicuous throughout much of 
the ongoing consideration of the bank question, though not entirely absent. 
Having long since recanted his support of a national bank, Calhoun fought 
unsuccessfully to prevent Clay from securing a repeal of the Independent 
Treasury that he (Calhoun) had helped establish beneath Martin Van Buren’s 
presidency, and he fixedly opposed Clay’s attempts to reestablish a bank in its 
place. Beyond the bank, Calhoun continued to oppose Clay’s every effort to push 
parts of his American System through the Senate, as he believed that winning the 
bank battle was but half a victory over the Whigs.
10
 
Frustrated over Tyler’s two bank vetoes and wishing to suppress Tyler’s 
potential influence on the protective system, Clay drafted two constitutional 
amendments to limit the presidential veto power.
11
 In the first, he proposed to the 
Senate that the constitutional stipulation which requires a two-thirds majority vote 
in both houses of congress in order to override a presidential veto be changed to 
require only a simple majority among both houses; in the second, he proposed an 
abolition of the “pocket veto” by suggesting that the President be given an 
additional three days for deliberation should Congress adjourn during the 
President’s ten day consideration period.
12
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“An Assemblage of Nations” – the Groundwork for Religious Republicanism 
 
Taking the floor more than one month into the debate, on February 28, 
1842, Calhoun presented his refutation as a tripartite argument.
13
 First, he 
endeavored to prove false Clay’s assertion that the people of the several states 
make up a nation whose will is represented by a simple numerical majority, 
drawing from his argument the first of two broad principles. Second, he sought to 
justify this first principle through an analysis of the structure of each of the three 
government branches. Third, Calhoun concluded the speech by addressing 
contentions that the President’s power had become overbearing. In each of these, 
Calhoun tried to ground an abstract devotion to republican theory—a devotion not 
unlike religious piety—in very particular examples and practical reasoning. 
Calhoun began by contradicting one implication of Clay’s notion of 
nationhood—that, “the President is not chosen by the voice of numerical majority, 
and does not, therefore, according to his principle, represent truly the will of the 
nation.”
14
 In the first of several statistical demonstrations, Calhoun effectively 
showed how, largely due to the boost in influence given to the small states by the 
addition of the two electoral votes representative of their senate seats, the nineteen 
smallest states combined could achieve a majority in the electoral college whereas 
the seven largest states, with a collective population of a million-and-a-half 
greater than that of the other states, could fall short of the same end.
15
 This 
demonstration presaged Calhoun’s method throughout the speech: inducting from 
specific examples (some factual and others hypothetical like that of the Electoral 
College) broad principles about the nature of the United States government. 
Calhoun’s strategy closely aligns with a traditional inductive approach, which 
relies on rhetorical examples (from the Latin exemplum) to “connect particular 
cases to a general rule.”
16
 
 Having established this mode of argument, Calhoun appealed to the 
Constitution as authoritatively disproving Clay’s assertion that the people’s will is 
expressed by a mere numerical majority. If Clay’s point were true, Calhoun says, 
“we may fairly expect to find that will, pronounced through the absolute majority, 
pervading every part of that instrument.”
17
 Calhoun showed that Clay’s contention 
falls short of this reasonable expectation, again drawing upon two specific lines of 
evidence: first, that the manner in which the Constitution was adopted—requiring 
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the ratification of only nine out of the twelve states—gave any four states, 
regardless of their populations, the power to inhibit the document from becoming 
supreme law; and second, that both of the constitutionally-prescribed methods for 
proposing amendments command the agreement of only three-quarters of the 
states, again without regard to their populations.
18
 
 The use of these two evidentiary claims serves a broader purpose than to 
simply exhibit the Constitution’s disregard for the numerical majority; Calhoun 
used them as proofs of a wide-reaching proposition: 
 
Instead of a nation, we are in reality an assemblage of nations, or peoples 
(if the plural noun may be used where the language affords none), united 
in their sovereign character immediately and directly by their own act, but 




The assembled “nations” were the states, which in Calhoun’s view maintained 
sovereignty over the Constitution as the entities from which it derives its 
authority. This stance of Calhoun’s, for which he is remembered today, would 
have been increasingly familiar to his fellow Senators; Calhoun spread his 
concurrent majority theory during this final decade of his life, beginning work on 
his famous Disquisition on Government in 1841.
20
 Even if familiar, Calhoun’s 
highly theoretical ideas had to be made popular by his ethos as a statesman and by 
his offering long lists of specific examples. Calhoun focused on the electoral 
college, constitutional ratification, and amendment proposals to demonstrate 
practical reasoning for his abstract principles. Furthermore, the examples chosen, 
each related to the Constitution, lay the groundwork for an eventual call to his 
fellow Senators to likewise look upon the government as a divine covenant 
between the founders and the American people. 
Calhoun carried this careful, example-laden appeal into an absolute logical 
binary. Either the will of the numerical majority is not the organ of the entire 
people, said Calhoun, or “our political system is throughout a profound and 
radical error.” Using the argument from absurdity (ad ridiculum) he 
recommended the only remedy of the second case: to completely demolish the 
system. “Is the Senator prepared to commence the work of demolition?” asked 
Calhoun.
21
 Clay would have to shoulder the complete dismantling of the United 
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Calhoun’s question is the first in a lengthy series of rhetorical questions 
that function collectively to transition from the work of establishing Calhoun’s 
theory of concurrent majority to the work of justifying it by the Constitution.
23
 
The South Carolinian framed the questions in such a way as to invoke fear of 
tyranny in the form of simple majority. As such, the questions embody what a 
critic today might call “religious republicanism”—a nineteenth century political 
ideal that extolled the government outlined in the Constitution as a “covenant” 
with the founders. The subtle blending of religious imagery and traditional 
republican principles that classifies religious republicanism exemplifies a 
tendency in early American discourse to borrow language and ideas from multiple 
thought traditions.
24
 In this speech, as in much of his discourse, Calhoun is 
primarily concerned with protecting common interest from erosion by corrupt 
government, a central aim of classical republicanism. But he conveys the urgency 
of this concern by framing its consequences in religious terms. Hence, Calhoun is 
not making an argument on religious grounds; rather he uses religious depiction to 
frame and fortify a classic republican argument. 
In the specific case of his question of Clay, Calhoun used religious 
imagery to depict a governmental hell avoided only by a rejection of simple 
numerical majority. Within that dominant paradigm of religious republicanism, 
Calhoun could effectively call for a return to simple government, contra the very 
simple idea of majority rule, even as his reading of the constitutional covenant 
could be quite complex. He fortified his argument by phrasing it interrogatively, 
which would have driven the attending Senators to conclude on their own terms 
this “simple truth”: that the Constitution’s complexity and its origin in complex 
state-based negotiations formed a covenant divinely logical and sanctified. 
 
“What then is to be done?” – the Covenant Moved Forward 
 
 In the second part of his address, Calhoun analyzed the constitutional 
structure for each of the departments of government. Calhoun’s premise 
throughout this entire portion of the speech was that the Constitution was already 
designed to support his idea that the more the voices in government concur in the 
enactment of a law, the more perfect that law will be as a representation of the 
people’s will. Calhoun’s call was thus not to rewrite or rethink the Constitution, 
but to return to it in its original form in concurrent majorities, a doctrine he would 
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expand throughout his career far beyond literal Constitutional interpretation. He 
drew once more on rhetorical examples to accomplish this goal.  
Beginning his journey through the branches of government in the 
legislature, Calhoun quickly reiterated that to confer power exclusively to the 
House of Representatives would lead to repressive rule over nearly half of the 
total population, but that to grant the Senate unshared power would conversely 
lead to the absolute control of the majority by states in the population minority. It 
followed that one of the strengths of the Constitution was that it required “the 
concurrence of the two” houses; their combined assent represented a “more full 
and perfect expression of the voice of the people.”
25
 Calhoun finished by 
addressing the function of the judicial branch, reminding his fellow senators that, 
should the Supreme Court declare unconstitutional a law under their examination, 
their ruling acts effectually as a “permanent veto.”
26
 He implied yet again that 
such a power, if unbridled, would be detrimental to the constitutional system, 
which required the judiciary to be checked in its own power even as it served as a 
check on the lawmaking powers of the legislative and executive branches. 
 Appropriately, Calhoun made his most substantial case for a 
constitutionally-justified concurrent majority in reviewing the role of the 
presidential veto within the overall structure of government. The executive veto, 
Calhoun insisted, acts as the surest safeguard to protect the division of powers; 
more importantly, it “[increases] the number of voices necessary to [the 
government’s] action;” and it is rightly entrusted to the President, who, unlike 
members of the legislature, is elected by and responsible to all of the states, 
causing him to “look more to the interest of the whole” (emphasis in original).
27
 
Calhoun consequently concluded from his analysis that each of the three 
branches of government: 
 
…acting through their appropriate organs, are intended to widen its basis 
and render it more popular, instead of less, by increasing the number 
necessary to put it in action—and having for their object to prevent one 
portion of the community from aggrandizing or enriching itself at the 
expense of the other, and to restrict the whole to the sphere intended by 




This conclusion also relied heavily on examples to form a second inverted 
principle—that less simple-majority governance built a more direct and powerful 
democracy. Even as the founders had been very suspicious of and almost 
completely avoided the term “democracy,” Calhoun had to make the case that 
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they did in fact have representative democracy at the heart of their thinking, 
knowing that democracy needs “appropriate organs” to refine and sort popular 
opinion. 
 This second principle invited a potential counterargument—that while the 
Constitution provides some checks against usurpation of power by a single faction 
or interest in all branches of government, it in no way prevents it absolutely.
 29
 
Calhoun recognized this lack of protection against the preponderance of a single 
interest, but again utilized inductive generalization to show the effect historically. 
The Constitution halted the abuse of power on many occasions, but had not 
eliminated such abuse altogether.
30
  Calhoun attributed this shortfall to the 
functionaries of the government rather than to the composition and structure of 
the Constitution itself.
31
 By shifting the blame from the Constitution to active 
government representatives, Calhoun sought to purify the nation’s founders of not 
trusting democracy and majority decision-making—a blot on the founders that 
Clay’s veto revision proposal suggested. This happened in the same way that 
church leaders would desire to purify the life of Jesus of Nazareth in order to 
emphasize his sinless nature. James H. Read, in his book on the political thought 
of Calhoun, contends that “Calhoun argued that a consolidation of all three 
branches in the hands of the same majority was certain to occur over time unless 
prevented—and the Constitution itself did not prevent it.”
32
 Even if the Bible did 
not prevent sin from happening, by returning to a central covenant, the “people of 
the Book” could cleanse themselves of wrongdoing. Prophets like Calhoun were 
needed to correct this backsliding away from an original constitutional faith. 
Of course, the founders were not without faults or self-interests. Calhoun’s 
maneuver is, at best, effective as an appeal to the founder’s greater wisdom, as if 
it were “divinely inspired.” However, the appeal lacked sufficient constitutional 
evidence to prove his case that the departments of government all exist to increase 
the popular voice. More reliance on the words and documents of the drafters of 
the Constitution as to their own views on democratic majorities, rather than 
deifying their wisdom and reputations, would have helped bridge the gap between 
Calhoun’s analysis of the government structure and his conclusion. 
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Calhoun reinforced his second, weaker principle through further appeal to 
religious republicanism, depicting the inevitable hell at the end of the present 
path: 
 
As the Government approaches nearer and nearer to the one absolute and 
single power—the will of the greater number—its action will become 
more and more disturbed and irregular; faction, corruption, and anarchy, 
will more and more abound; patriotism will daily decay, and affection and 
reverence for the Government grow weaker and weaker—until the final 
shock occurs, when the system will rush into ruin; and the sword take the 




Calhoun’s language here again reflects a fear of corruption common to his era of 
government. He evoked the spirit of republicanism to warn against a persistent 
disordering of the government and increasing chaos among the people. 
Epitomizing this call to “republican faith,” Calhoun made vivid the hellish 
consequence that would result from the government’s sin of numerical majority, 
unless repentance led his peers back to the Constitution).  
 
“The Fault is Not in the Constitution” – Calhoun’s Final Defense 
 
 As he neared the close of the speech, Calhoun emphasized the overuse of 
power by government officeholders in a return to Clay’s specific amendment to 
limit the presidential veto. Senator William Archer of Virginia supported the 
amendment on the presumption that the executive power had ceased to be a 
prudent check on the legislature and become instead a forward attack 
mechanism—that it had been “converted into a sword to attack, instead of a shield 
to defend, as was originally intended.”
34
 Clay too believed that the president could 
“hamper and usually kill congressional initiatives merely by intimating that he 
would veto them.”
35
 Calhoun, without confirming or denying that the executive 
power had become too authoritative, exhibited that, as the executive branch 
possesses no lawmaking powers, the President can only exercise powers that are 
either enumerated in the Constitution or granted to him by the legislation of 
Congress. If the executive power had been elevated beyond its intended sphere 
and posed any sort of threat to the workings of the government or to the liberty of 
people, Calhoun argued, “the fault is not in the constitution, but in Congress,” 
whose “acts and omissions” effected the change.
36
 This capacity to condemn 
himself and his peers in Congress stands in contrast to most prudent 
                                                        
33
 Calhoun, “Speech on the Veto Power,” 503. 
34
 Calhoun, “Speech on the Veto Power,” 504-505. 
35
 Heidler and Heidler, Henry Clay, 359. 
36
 Calhoun, “Speech on the Veto Power,” 509. 
 
communication, which instead invites orators to praise their audience. Yet, in an 
analogy to the church, Calhoun stood as sinner amongst sinners declaiming the 
Word, no matter the harshness of his invective. 
 As indicated by the general way in which Calhoun discussed his principles 
and the various functions of the government branches, the majority of the speech 
aimed at examining the role of the veto power outside of the specific context of 
the bank vetoes and impending compromise of 1833 expiration. As I will discuss 
in the next section, this global approach to the debate is one of the elements of the 
speech which made it successful; however, the speech was still a direct refutation 
of Clay’s proposed amendments, which, despite Clay’s arguments otherwise, 
were products of the current political unrest.
37
 Calhoun would have been remiss if 
he had failed to address the specific issues that had given rise to the occasion 
before concluding his speech. 
Hence he attributed the engorgement of the executive power (earlier 
attributed to the acts and omissions of Congress generally) specifically to the 
passage of—and therefore nonuse of the veto on—“the original bank, the 
connection with the banking system, the tariffs of 1824 and 1828, and the 
numerous acts appropriating money for roads, canals, harbors, and a long list of 
other measures not less unconstitutional.”
38
 In other words, Calhoun claimed that 
Congress’ carelessness regarding Hamilton’s Bank and Clay’s American System 




We see Calhoun’s own interests shining through this portion of his 
conclusion. Expressing his disapproval of the bank, protective tariffs, and internal 
improvement projects served mostly as a personal attack on Clay, for whom 
Calhoun openly voiced his dislike.
40
 Yet it also revealed Calhoun’s tendency to 
change his viewpoint on issues whenever they ceased to serve his ideology. For 
example, earlier in his career, Calhoun supported internal improvement projects, 
and he did not directly oppose the establishment of a national bank; however, 
upon reaching the conclusion that all government-bank connections were opposed 
to states’ rights because they promoted consolidated government, he began to 
deny outright the constitutionality of a national bank.
41
 Although unable to admit 
his own sins at this occasion, Calhoun stood ready to lead the group back to the 
founders’ covenant. 
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The Nationalist Nullifier – the Impact of Calhoun’s Speech 
 
 The first impacts of Calhoun’s defense of the executive veto were 
immediately observable within the walls of the U.S. Senate chamber. Calhoun 
biographer Charles Wiltse writes that “[Calhoun’s] speech was so concise and 
compact as to defy abridgement, yet so clearly reasoned that in the course of a 
little over an hour he altered the whole tenor of the debate.”
42
 Wiltse also recounts 
that the speech was widely endorsed by Senators across partisan divisions,
43
 a 
sentiment echoed by The Congressional Globe, which said of the speech that it 
was “justly esteemed one of the ablest, most luminous, and unanswerable, ever 
delivered on the nature of this Government.”
44
 Outside of the Senate, “the speech 
received unprecedented circulation,” with 46,000 copies of a pamphlet edition 




 The unanswerable nature of Calhoun’s speech may have derived from a 
conviction that regardless of what side one took in the bank and tariff debates, no 
one could claim that any of the intricacies of the U.S. constitutional system, of 
which the veto was but one, were put into place accidentally—another appeal to 
the wisdom of the founders as being far greater than that of the present leadership. 
This argument, in combination with a direct attack on Clay’s motives by 
Pennsylvania Senator James Buchanan, provides a clear indication as to why 
Clay’s amendments never came to a vote.
 46
 Calhoun, unlike Clay, was not as 
intimately involved in the Tyler bank controversy, another contributing factor to 
the success of his oration, which spoke so broadly of the nature of the U.S. 
government as to transcend the immediate debate. As such, it represented a sort of 
reversal in the ethos of the leading political men of the time, in which the most 
sectional issues in Congress were aggravated by nationalists like Clay and John 
Quincy Adams, while Calhoun, the famous Nullifier, made an analysis “that put 
in proper proportions the sectional conflict of interest, and showed it to be not 
irreconcilable within the constitutional framework.”
47
 Calhoun’s speech 
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accomplished this by imploring his fellow Senators to shift their concern from 
specific, sectional issues to broad principles—from whether this or that fiscal 
entity was a better government investment to whether it was the government’s 
place to incorporate banks in the first place. For Calhoun, defending the veto 
power was, on the one hand, not about the Bank or about any other execution or 
abstention of the veto, but about the preservation of principle—about the 
paramount importance of the greater good.
48
 
On the other hand, it was indeed a sectional conflict of interest Calhoun 
intended to advance by giving this address. At the time, he was vigorously 
attempting to achieve a renegotiation of the tariff compromise of 1833 so as to 
effect lower tariffs on Southern goods.
49
 Based on Tyler’s actions up to this point, 
it is likely that he would have vetoed any increase in the tariff rate established by 
the compromise (he helped draft the compromise)—a use of the veto Calhoun 
would have very much supported as it would have meant more wealth for his 
constituents—had the Treasury not been wholly depleted.
50
 Similarly, despite 
Calhoun denouncing in an 1841 speech given in Montgomery “that ‘the all 
absorbing question’ among the people ‘was not whether great fundamental 
principles should be established or overthrown, but who should be President,’”
51
 
his speech on the veto power “was consciously advancing the platform on which 
he meant to seek the Democratic nomination” for President in 1844.
52
 
Calhoun ultimately aimed to protect against uninhibited popular 
sovereignty, and his call for an unwavering faith in the republicanism of the 
founders served as the principle means for doing so. His use of religious imagery 
is perhaps not surprising when we consider that such imagery also pervaded 
Calhoun’s view of “man’s” political function: “Constitution is the contrivance of 
man, while government is of Divine ordination. Man is left to perfect what the 
wisdom of the Infinite ordained, as necessary to preserve the race.”
53
 The Second 
Great Awakening had a huge effect on the nation’s discourse, as itinerant pastors 
made their way through even backcountry South Carolina, with church 
enrollments soaring. Calhoun was certainly no religious zealot, but a kind of civic 
religion circulated widely in his time, grounding his theories of sovereignty, 
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majority rule, and race as divinely sanctioned. Despite being a holy mission, any 
government-produced constitution, compromise, or law was inherently flawed for 
Calhoun, as “the Creator” had endowed mankind with both great purpose and 
dignity but also unholy passion and self-interest. Because of this, Calhoun 
maintained reluctance to vest ultimate sovereignty in a people who lack “the 
wisdom of the Infinite,” or to think of any product of governance as absolutely 
pure. 
This view seems inconsonant with the rhetoric in this speech, which 
suggests that the Constitution and not government is divinely inspired. But 
Calhoun’s rhetorical glorification of the founders and the Constitution would have 
appealed to citizens of the era. Calhoun’s willingness to complicate his ethos by 
reversing his own ideas speaks to the rhetorical lengths to which he would go to 
protect regional interests, proving Calhoun to be no less self-interested than many 
of those whom he feared would corrupt the government. Not necessarily opposed 
to the popular voice, Calhoun relied upon it only as far as would be essential to 
protect “principle” against expanding suffrage and equality. Calhoun’s view of 
“principle” nonetheless served his own interests, which included protecting his 
states’ rights agenda; preserving rule by the elite, whom he presumed had better 
knowledge and more vested interests in the nation; and defending slavery and 
renegotiating tariffs whenever population growth in the North outpaced 
population growth in the South. Constructing his argument in a way that revealed 
this careful negotiation between popular sovereignty and particular interests, 
Calhoun renewed a sacred covenant with the founders that outstripped all debate 
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